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Abstract: Timothy Williamson uses a thought
experiment about superintelligent Martians who
speak a language humans are incapable of
understanding (much of) to argue against the
thesis of universal translatability of languages
defended by for instance Donald Davidson.
Williamson concludes that the notion of truth in
such theses is tied to human abilities, and is
therefore relativistic. This paper defends
Davidson’s thesis of universal translatability by
arguing that Williamson conflates the notions of
intelligence and rationality; by pulling these
notions apart the challenge dissipates. 
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Resumen: Timothy Williamson utiliza un experi-
mento mental sobre marcianos superinteligentes
que hablan un lenguaje que, en su mayor parte,
los humanos son incapaces de entender para criti-
car las tesis de la traducibilidad universal de los
lenguajes defendidas, por ejemplo, por Donald
Davidsoon. Williamson concluye que la noción de
verdad en tales tesis está vinculada a capacidades
humanas y es por ello relativista. Este artículo
defiende la tesis de Davidson de la traducibilidad
universal argumentando que Williamson solapa
las nociones de inteligencia y de racionalidad; si
se diferencia ambas nociones, el problema desa-
parece.
Palabras clave: interpretación, significado, prin-
cipio de caridad, relativismo, traducción, verdad.
1. Introduction
Truth is a central concept in Donald Davidson’s philosophy. He argues that our primitive grasp of
the concept of truth is what gives us the capacity to acquire language and beliefs, and thereby to
become a rational agent. He describes how this process is possible, given a pre-theoretic grasp of
truth, in great detail in his (posthumously published) Truth and Predication,1 arguing that an emer-
gence of verbal communication necessitates a minimal set of shared assumptions by the potential
speakers. Davidson’s proposed set of assumptions, the principle of charity, make it a necessary fea-
ture of linguistic communication that interlocutors can take each other to be (on the whole) correctly
talking about salient features of their shared environment. They must be able to locate other spea-
kers’ utterances in a logically coherent network, recognising that utterances about immediately
observable aspects of the of the interlocutors must be (mostly, at least) mistake free. Aspects of the
shared immediate environment can then be recognised as causes of these observation sentences,
which themselves presuppose the recognition that they can be mistaken—the notion of error pre-
supposes a grasp of concept of truth by requiring a contrast between veridical and erroneous utte-
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3 Timothy Williamson 1987, «Anthropocentrism and Truth», Philosophia 17. 33-53.
4 Ibid., p. 34.
rances. This ability to locate utterances in a logical space, to grasp their relations and consequences,
be that logical or ethical, is what rationality itself amounts to.
The first utterances we can understand are therefore necessarily about the salient features of our
environment, about the objects and persons we can readily perceive. Complexity, which includes
abstract concepts can be built on the foundations of our understanding of utterances with a more
observable content, but our sensitivity to agreement and disagreement with our fellow interlocutors
will always remain crucial; in practice we need to have a grasp of basic logical constants such as
negation and conjunction to make sense of speakers. 
Our comprehension of languages is elucidated as an ability to construct theories of truth that
entail all the possible sentences a speaker may utter; thereby giving us knowledge of why and when
the speaker’s utterances are true or false. The philosophy of language that emerges from these pre-
mises is normative: to have meanings we must have minimal but inherent standards of correctness
and acceptability, provided by the principle of charity. It follows that notions such as convention and
reference are not necessary for understanding, which explains why our potential for speaking lan-
guages is so flexible and universal. Being rational is a necessary condition for being a speaker,
rationality, based on a normative grasp of truth, is what gives speakers of languages a shared plat-
form upon which to base verbal communication.
An interesting consequence of Davidson’s philosophy of language is that it is incoherent to sup-
pose that there could be creatures that speak a language that we could in principle not understand.
This is a foundational conclusion for Davidson’s philosophy, because the notion of meaning is tied
to truth. An inability of an interpreter to detect any sort of regularity between the presumed speaker’s
behaviour, the noises he makes, and the immediate environment would make it impossible for the
interpreter to come up with any kind of theory of meaning for understanding the speaker. Conse-
quently he has no evidence to suggest that the presumed speaker is doing more than producing ran-
dom (or at most animal) noises. Truth is the central concept for all interpretation because all
language users must have had an inherent understanding of truth in order to acquire their linguistic
skills. Given a grasp of truth, there are no principled obstacles to the translatability of languages, and
consequently, for Davidson, all truths are expressible in language.2
Timothy Williamson3 challenges Davidson’s philosophy with a dilemma. He argues that either
the notion of truth in the project is anthropocentric, or it makes speakers of language potentially
omniscient.4 The first horn is crippling for Davidson, whereas the absurdity of the second horn
depends on the operative term «potentially». An anthropocentric truth falls short by being a relati-
vistic concept, and therefore Davidson’s philosophy falls short of giving a general philosophy of
truth, language and rationality. If Williamson is right, it is possible that there are languages that are
unintelligible to humans and therefore countless truths that are humanly unintelligible. Williamson’s
serious challenge against Davidson’s philosophy proceeds by blocking Davidson’s argument against
conceptual schemes in order to show that his notion of truth is in fact relative to human abilities,
which would be an intolerable result. But opting for the second horn, which is what I propose to do,
makes the potential omniscience nothing worse than omniscience in principle. This is hardly as
absurd as Williamson purports it to be, in fact it is the hopeful aim of many sober scientists to unco-
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ver all the secrets of the universe, c.f. Stephen Hawking’s «theory of everything». The relevant
question here is: Are we clever enough? (Answer: probably not.)
In §2 I present Williamson’s argument and in §3 I reject it with two possible responses available
for Davidson. There is some ambiguity as to what Williamson’s crucial premise about Martian lan-
guages amounts to, and the two responses are intended to cover both eventualities. In the end it is
Williamson who falls short.
2. Williamson’s argument
Williamson begins with the recognition that intelligence is not specific to humans, that there seems
to be a gradation of intelligence that starts with simple life forms and ends with humans. It is surely a
contingent fact that humans happen to be the most intelligent creatures around, and most likely there
exist superintelligent aliens somewhere in the universe whose cognitive capacities far exceed ours, as
ours exceed (say) cats’. Williamson argues from this that since it is very likely that 
…cats can think some simple thoughts but are physiologically incapable…of thinking
about complex numbers…we must assume that creatures can evolve whose thoughts could be
as closed to us as ours are to cats.5
This is the crucial premise, for if Williamson can establish it, he is able to go on to argue that there
can therefore be languages that are unintelligible to humans, contradicting Davidson’s rejection of con-
ceptual schemes, or his thesis of translatability of languages. If superintelligent Martians can think
thoughts that are unthinkable by humans, and thoughts are expressible in language, then Martians
express their thoughts in a Martian language that is in part unintelligible to humans. What’s worse, the
bits of their language that would be unintelligible to humans might not be recognisable as a language
by humans at all, contradicting Davidson’s argument that by the principle of charity all languages must
be recognisable as languages. Williamson argues that human languages might form a subclass of Mar-
tian languages, that there might be a core language we share with Martians while the bulk of Martian
discourse were unintelligible to humans, and thus untranslatable to human languages. The devastating
conclusion is that truth is not the crucial key to universal linguistic comprehension Davidson takes it to
be, and insofar as his philosophical system is based on this conception of truth, it fails.
3. Two Davidsonian responses
There are two equally viable ways for Davidson to respond to Williamson. Either he denies that
Martian is untranslatable, or he denies that the «untranslatable language» of Martians is a language
at all. Both responses may intitially raise a few eyebrows, so let me develop them a little. I’ll take the
two responses in turn.
3.1. The Martian language is not untranslatable to human languages
It is crucial that Williamson premises his whole argument on the cognitive superiority of Mar-
tians, comparable to our cognitive superiority to cats. But his mistake is to suppose that cats could
5 Ibid., p. 35.
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have simple thoughts, for in the context of Davidson’s philosophy this must be taken to mean truth-
evaluable thoughts, otherwise the challenge misses its mark. But Davidson has famously argued that
non-linguistic creatures can’t have thoughts, so there is no continuum of language-use and comple-
xity of thought between humans and cats.6 Instead, the difference is qualitative: humans are language
users, cats are not. If Martians are language users like us, there is no relevant analogy between cats
and humans that applies to humans and Martians. Williamson has therefore supplied no reason why
Martian language might in principle be unintelligible to us, all he has shown is that Martians are
capable of understanding concepts too complex for humans. This doesn’t yield an argument for
untranslatability of Martian languages, all it means is that in practice we can’t grasp many Martian
concepts. This is tolerable because Davidson’s argument doesn’t require, nor entail, that all speakers
should in practice be able to grasp (or, a fortiori to have) all the same concepts. It thereby avoids
charges of omniscience, by not requiring that a given human actually is able to grasp all Martian
concepts. The argument does require, however, that there are many concepts humans and Martians
share, but this is assumed by Williamson anyway.
There are many measures of intelligence (and it is not the onus of this essay to provide any com-
prehensive analysis of them) but an ability to grasp complex concepts is clearly one such measure.
The cleverest among us are often those who can grasp and articulate the most complex issues. The
complexities involved in cutting-edge sciences for instance are such that most laypeople have resig-
ned themselves to not even pretending to comprehend the concepts involved. They are, in practice,
unable to ever understand (say) a research article in Quantum Chromodynamics. The language used
in the article may be English at its core, but employs concepts many people might be (biologically,
even) unable to ever grasp due to a simple lack of processing power. This language is like Martian
in that it takes an everyday language as its subclass.
The crucial point here is that Davidson’s philosophy distinguishes intelligence from rationality:
all language users are rational while their intelligence varies widely. The higher the intelligence, the
greater their vocabulary and mastery of concepts, allowing some to entertain and express thoughts
the less intelligent can’t. But can this line of thought reach Williamson’s conclusion, and without
recourse to esoteric Martians? Predictably not, it fails for the same reason. Davidson explains that
languages are translatable because they can be learned through the employment of the principle of
charity, that is, by the realisation that languages are used by speakers to talk truly about the world,
that we can note the same salient features in the environment as the speaker, and correlate utterances
with these salient features. Once the communication has reached a sufficient level of sophistication,
abstract concepts can be added through description and definition, paving the way to infinite expres-
sibility. If Martian is a language, then it is in principle learnable by humans, even if in practice most
of its concepts may prove too difficult. Evidence to suggest that this is the correct interpretation of
Williamson can be seen when he writes that Martians themselves tell us that «only their more jejune
expressions had English equivalents.»7 But if their language is a language, those expressions could
of course be coined into English by the Martians themselves, who in Williamson’s thought experi-
ment appear as fluent English-speakers. Clearly no human language ever stays the same—new
words and grammar come as old ones go, and no word meaning is guaranteed to remain constant.
6 See Davidson 1975, «Thought and Talk» in Davidson 1984 (op. cit.) and Davidson 1982, «Rational Animals» in David-
son 2001 (op. cit.).
7 Williamson, p. 36.
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And yet we call many of these different entities «English.» It is clear that the Martian dialect of
English could (and should) be called English.
Williamson attempts to shield his argument from this kind of defence, what he brands Putnamian
«division of linguistic labor», which would take Martians to be simply experts of Martian concepts.8
Williamson notes, I think correctly, that a Martian concept which humans can’t grasp is not like
«elm» or «beech», because we still grasp that these pick out different kinds of trees even if we can’t
tell the two apart, nor know how they are different. He suggests a better analogy, that of esoteric mat-
hematical concepts, such as «Hausdorff space». My agreement on this issue with Williamson is inci-
dental, for it doesn’t establish his point. Even if there were many speakers of English incapable of
ever grasping this concept, it doesn’t follow that the compound «Hausdorff space» therefore isn’t
part of the English language. Clearly many English speakers successfully do use it to make true or
false claims they moreover know to be true or false precisely because of their grasp of the English
language. Davidson’s notion of truth and language doesn’t require that all speakers will in practice
be able to grasp the same concepts, in principle will do. This means that in practice intelligence will
present philosophically uninteresting limitations to our abilities to grasp concepts, which in no way
threatens to relativise the concept of truth nor make rationality an exclusively human concept. Inte-
lligence comes in degrees; rationality doesn’t.
Nor can Williamson argue, with Künne, that the different modes of sensory perceptions to
humans that Martians may possess make their language untranslatable to English.9 Suppose, for an
analogy, a community of colour blind speakers whose word «gred» applies to both green and red
objects. We couldn’t thereby suggest that «gred» simply means «green or red», because according to
this hypothesis true sentences like «All gred objects are of the same colour» would have no true
translation to English. The crucial move is that since for the community of colour-blinds the senten-
ces about green and red things would have no truth value, their notion of truth is relative to their
colour vision. The move is clearly fallacious, because no colour blind scientist, say, would claim (at
least based on only the fact that he can’t personally see the difference) that green and red didn’t pick
out objectively distinct features of the world, any more than he would claim that sentences about the
ultra-violet or infra-red have no truth value just because their truth-value can’t be determined with
the naked eye. The colour-blinds may be initially ignorant about green and red, but they would come
around given the overwhelming evidence. For instance the non-colour-blinds’ ability to consistently
differentiate between the two kinds of gred, resulting in their amazing prowess at finding strawbe-
rries in the field, say. What is expressible or true is in no way limited to what is observable to the
naked eye of some homogenous linguistic community.
If Martian is a language like English, then English has all the expressive potential Martian has,
but some sentences of this «Martian English» would be as opaque to us simple humans as Martian
was in the first place. But all the same, in principle we could learn it, and so there is nothing here for
Davidson to worry about.
3.2. The Martian language is not a language at all
Taking the opposite moral from the cat analogy, we might suppose Williamson to have meant
that the Martians are superior to us in exactly the way we are superior to cats. That is, not only are
8 Ibid., p. 38.
9 Wolfgang Künne 2003, Conceptions of Truth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 246-247.
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we more intelligent than cats in terms of brute brain power, we are also language users while cats are
not. Being language users allows us to conceptualise our environment in ways cats couldn’t dream
about, it allows us to structure and accumulate our knowledge, making us intellectually superior to
cats at almost every level. Suppose the Martians are superior to us in this kind of way. That would
mean that while they share our language skills the way we share with cats many non-verbal ways of
interaction, allowing us to communicate with animals such as our pets, the Martians can communi-
cate with us in our language, and they would moreover have their own «superlanguage». Superlan-
guage is a way of structuring and communicating information undreamed of by humans, just like
cats couldn’t have a clue about how rich human language is, we can not even begin to imagine the
extents of riches in the Martian superlanguage. 
But if this is right, then superlanguage isn’t a language. It isn’t learnable via truth, and truths
aren’t expressed in superlanguage. Davidson’s theory of language connects truth and language in a
way that make them interdependent; we can’t have one without the other,10 and superlanguages are
something entirely different. We might thus use the notions of superconcept, superthought and
supertruth to distinguish ordinary from superordinary, but the fact is that we have no idea what
superlanguage and the related superconcepts would even be. To be sure Davidson has never discus-
sed superlanguages, and it seems safe to suggest that the possibility of a superlanguage is orthogo-
nal to Davidson’s philosophy of language. Superlanguage is by definition something humans are in
principle incapable of grasping, quite like cats are incapable of grasping the concept of language. To
complete the analogy, we might suggest that what cats and dogs have, and what we share with them,
is a sublanguage, with the corresponding subthoughts and subconcepts. When we communicate
with our pets we use sublanguage, we don’t demand (nor expect) that our pets will engage in deba-
tes with us, but interactions mediated by sublanguage can be very emotionally fulfilling nonetheless,
and the comradery that emerges is not unlike that between two humans. It is therefore clear that
humans use sublanguage quite regularly also between each other. Language, however, is not
«sublanguage and more», it is a completely distinct way of interacting.
It may be the fact that people tend to very easily confuse or muddle their use of sublanguage with
their use of language which explains why people so commonly assume that their pets understand
language. If the use of sublanguage together with language is commonplace for humans, it is unders-
tandable that we find it difficult to pull the two systems apart. Understandable or not, it is a mistake
all the same. For Williamson to suggest that the Martian superlanguage is in this way «like our lan-
guage and more» is to commit this same mistake in the opposite direction. The Martians would have
three systems to our two, allowing them to communicate with us (and our pets), but blocks us (and
our pets) from engaging with them on the level of superlanguage.
4. Conclusion
My diagnosis of Williamson’s argument suggests that he intended the argument from §3.1 to
yield the conclusion of §3.2, i.e. that a difference in conceptual sophistication between linguistic
communities entails untranslatability of languages. His mistake was to confuse a continuous grada-
tion of intelligence with a bogus continuum of rationality. He needs a different argument to show
that there is more than one kind of rationality—simply stipulating a new kind of Martian «superra-
10 Full-blown concept of truth, that is. As stated earlier, a pre-theoretical grasp of truth is a necessary condition for language
acquisition.
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tionality» amounts to changing the subject. Davidson can therefore consistently claim that we can’t
grasp Martian concepts due to our stupidity, while maintaining that this has no implications about
rationality, or our possession of it, nor the universality of language and truth.
The deciding question is whether the Martians make use of the Principle of Charity. If they do,
their language is translatable into English, no matter how terse and difficult it may be for humans to
understand. Davidson himself is very clear on this point: 
Since charity is not an option, but a condition of having a workable theory, it is
meaningless to suggest that we might fall into massive error by endorsing it. Until we have
successfully established a systematic correlation of sentences held true with sentences held
true, there are no mistakes to make. Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if
we want to understand others, we must count them right on most matters. If we can
produce a theory that reconciles charity and the formal conditions for a theory, we have
done all that could be done to ensure communication. Nothing more is possible and
nothing more is needed.11
If they don’t, their communication is conveyed in superlanguage, and all bets are off about what
else is really going on. Truth, in any case, is not involved. I can only suggest, vacuously enough,
that superlanguage is something that is based on supertruth and supermeaning, which in some
sense are more sophisticated versions of truth and meaning. It is perhaps noteworthy that science
fiction writers often make their aliens capable of communicating in some superior manner that
usually involves telepathy and mind-bending. The idea of Martians with a superlanguage is nothing
new.12
11 Davidson 1974, «On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme», in Davidson 1984 (op.cit.), p. 197.
12 I would like to thank Mark Textor for extremely helpful suggestions on an earlier draft.
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